Diplomacy as a Weapon: How M23/RDF Offensives Intensify When Kagame and Tshisekedi Travel Abroad

Diplomacy as a Weapon: How M23/RDF Offensives Intensify When Kagame and Tshisekedi Travel Abroad – and the Disguised Attitudes of Kagame That Everyone Knows Yet Few Dare to Confront

For more than two decades, the crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has unfolded within a web of geopolitical manoeuvres, military strategies, diplomatic theatrics, and narratives designed to obscure responsibilities. At the centre of this complex landscape lies a phenomenon observed repeatedly by international researchers, UN investigators, diplomats, journalists, and Congolese civilians alike: M23 offensives — supported, according to numerous United Nations reports, by the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) — intensify precisely when Rwanda's President Paul Kagame travels abroad.

A second, equally troubling dynamic has emerged in recent years: M23/RDF offensives also escalate when DRC President Félix Tshisekedi travels abroad, whether for diplomatic missions, regional summits, or bilateral engagements. These patterns are not accidental. They form part of a deliberate, multi-layered strategy in which diplomacy, political timing, and military opportunism are woven together to maximise Rwanda's influence while weakening the Congolese state.

But beneath this strategy lies something deeper: the disguised attitudes of Paul Kagame — an overt denial of involvement in Congo's war, wrapped in polished diplomacy — attitudes that everyone recognises yet few governments confront openly. This dual reality defines one of the most cynical geopolitical crises of the modern African continent.

This 3,000-word document analyses the phenomenon through three dimensions:

1. The intensification of M23/RDF operations during Kagame's travels, and what this reveals about Rwanda's military structure.
2. The escalation of attacks during Tshisekedi's foreign missions and what this exposes about Congo's institutional vulnerabilities.
3. Kagame's disguised attitude — a posture of denial known to all but challenged by almost none — and how it shapes international responses.

I. When Kagame Travels, M23 Attacks Intensify: The Anatomy of a Strategic Pattern

1. A pattern too consistent to ignore

Since the re-emergence of the M23 rebel movement in 2012 — and especially since its resurgence in 2021 — investigators have noticed a recurring pattern: whenever Paul Kagame travels abroad, M23 offensives in eastern Congo intensify noticeably.

These escalations are not random. They involve:

• the capture of strategic towns,
• the cutting of major supply routes,
• coordinated assaults on FARDC positions,
• heightened use of military drones,
• and systematic displacement of civilians.

The timing is so consistent that it has become a geopolitical indicator in itself:
Kagame in Europe or the US → M23 gains ground in North Kivu.

2. Rwanda's military structure does not depend on Kagame's physical presence

Military analysts emphasise a crucial point: Kagame does not need to be in Rwanda for the RDF-M23 machinery to operate. Rwanda's military structure is:

• highly centralised,
• rigidly disciplined,
• extremely loyal to Kagame,
• and fully capable of executing pre-defined strategies autonomously.

Decisions made at the highest level flow down a narrow, controlled chain of command. Once orders and strategic objectives are set, operations proceed without interruption — whether Kagame is in Kigali, Doha, Washington, or Paris.

Thus, the intensification of attacks during Kagame's travels does not imply that he is directing operations from an aircraft or hotel room minute by minute. Rather, it demonstrates that:

The Rwandan military system supporting the M23 remains fully active, organised, and aligned with Kagame's strategic vision, even in his physical absence.

3. Kagame's foreign trips serve as political camouflage

One of the most revealing — and disturbing — aspects of this pattern is how Kagame's foreign missions offer him a convenient political shield. When he is seen on the world stage:

• speaking about peace and stability,
• advocating for African unity,
• condemning insecurity in the region,
• or promoting Rwanda as a model of progress,

it becomes easier for him to deny any involvement in the simultaneous military escalation in Congo.

It is a simple but effective tactic:
being elsewhere to deny involvement at home.

Diplomatically, this façade is powerful. Kagame presents himself as a responsible statesman while the RDF-supported M23 expands its territorial control.

4. Kagame's disguised attitude — known to all, confronted by none

Paul Kagame's public posture regarding the Congo war follows a predictable script:

• He denies any Rwandan involvement.
• He dismisses UN reports as politically biased.
• He blames the FDLR for all instability.
• He portrays Rwanda as a misunderstood victim.
• He accuses Congo of failing to govern itself.

Yet behind closed doors, diplomats and international analysts acknowledge a very different truth:
Everyone knows Rwanda is deeply involved. Everyone knows the M23 is not an independent movement. Everyone knows the RDF supplies, trains, and sometimes directly commands its fighters.

Kagame's disguised attitude is therefore not ignorance — it is performance.
A diplomatic show.
A calculated fiction.
A mask worn deliberately because he knows the world will not challenge him seriously.

His confidence in this impunity has become part of the strategy itself.

II. When Tshisekedi Travels, M23 Makes Gains: Exploiting Congo's Structural Vulnerabilities

1. A military apparatus dependent on presidential presence

Unlike Rwanda's disciplined and vertical military, the FARDC suffers from:

• chronic underfunding,
• weak logistics,
• corruption,
• internal rivalries,
• lack of unified command,
• infiltration by foreign interests.

In such an environment, President Tshisekedi's presence is more than symbolic — it is operational. His role is crucial for:

• consolidating command structures,
• accelerating decision-making,
• coordinating political-military responses,
• maintaining pressure on senior officers.

When Tshisekedi travels abroad, the cohesion of the military apparatus weakens.

2. M23/RDF offensives intensify during these absences

M23/RDF commanders appear to understand this vulnerability perfectly. UN investigations document rapid advances of the rebel movement during periods when Tshisekedi is abroad, including:

• major assaults on FARDC positions,
• coordinated offensives targeting weakened sectors,
• seizing of towns and villages with minimal resistance,
• encirclement of strategic areas.

Examples include offensives around:

• Bunagana,
• Rutshuru,
• Tongo,
• Kishishe,
• Nyanzale,
• Mweso.

These attacks were not spontaneous but planned to coincide with moments when the Congolese political machine — already strained — becomes even less responsive.

3. A dual exploitation: Rwanda's strength vs. Congo's vulnerabilities

The contrast between the two states explains the strategic timing:

• Rwanda's system is so centralised that Kagame's absence changes nothing.
• Congo's system is so fragile that Tshisekedi's absence changes everything.

Thus, M23/RDF exploits:

• Kagame's travel as diplomatic cover,
• Tshisekedi's travel as an operational opening.

This dual mechanism allows the rebel movement to expand territorial control while avoiding immediate political consequences.

III. Kagame's Disguised Attitude: A Global Secret That Few Governments Dare Expose

1. Denial as a tool of statecraft

Kagame's behaviour in relation to Congo follows a well-crafted diplomatic choreography:

1. Deny everything.
2. Blame the FDLR.
3. Frame Rwanda as a victim.
4. Present Congo as irresponsible and chaotic.
5. Accuse UN experts of bias.
6. Promote Rwanda's image as disciplined and modern.

This formula has allowed him to maintain international partnerships, attract massive aid, and preserve his global reputation — even while international reports identify Rwanda as a destabilising force.

2. Everyone knows — and yet silence prevails

In diplomatic circles:

• ambassadors know,
• African Union officials know,
• UN representatives know,
• Western intelligence services know,
• humanitarian organisations know,
• Congolese civilians know intimately.

It is an open secret that Rwanda supports the M23.
But geopolitics — interests, alliances, minerals, military cooperation — prevents open condemnation.

Thus, Kagame's disguised attitude persists because it is politically convenient for powerful actors to look the other way.

3. Impunity as a strategic weapon

The absence of meaningful consequences emboldens the pattern:

• Offensives intensify.
• Rwanda denies involvement.
• The international community hesitates.
• The cycle repeats.

Kagame has understood that in a world driven by interests, denial is often as effective as truth, especially when backed by military power, economic networks, and control of narrative.

Conclusion: A War Fought in Three Arenas

The conflict in eastern Congo is not merely a battlefield confrontation. It is a multi-dimensional geopolitical struggle fought simultaneously across:

1. The diplomatic arena

Where Kagame uses foreign travel as political camouflage and Tshisekedi attempts to rally international support.

2. The institutional arena

Where Rwanda's disciplined system contrasts sharply with Congo's fragile military structures.

3. The psychological arena

Where Kagame's disguised attitudes — known to all, confronted by none — sustain a climate of impunity that enables the continuation of violence.

Understanding these layers is essential for any meaningful peace strategy.

References

• United Nations Group of Experts on the DRC (reports: 2012, 2013, 2014, 2018, 2022, 2023).
• Report S/2022/479 – Evidence of RDF involvement in M23 operations.
• Report S/2023/573 – Documentation of logistical supply routes between Rwanda and M23.

• Human Rights Watch (HRW), reports 2012–2024.
• Amnesty International, North Kivu conflict assessments.
• Global Witness, investigations on financial and mining networks linked to M23/RDF.

• Congo Research Group (CRG), New York University.
• International Crisis Group (ICG), reports on eastern DRC dynamics.
• Rift Valley Institute (RVI), publications on Great Lakes political-military networks.

• BBC Africa Eye, investigations on M23 and Rwanda.
• Reuters investigative dossiers on RDF deployments.
• The New York Times, geopolitical analyses of Rwanda's role.
• Le Monde (France), detailed reporting on coordinated M23 offensives.